Legitimising EU Policymaking: What Role for National Parliaments?  EPC Discussion Paper, 28 January 2014 by Stratulat, Corina et al.
  
Legitimising EU Policymaking: 
What Role for National Parliaments? 
Discussion Papers 
for Session 1 of the BTTD 2014 
jointly organised by the Bertelsmann Stiftung, the European Policy Centre (EPC) 
and the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
prepared by 
Corina Stratulat and Janis A. Emmanouilidis, European Policy Centre (EPC) 
Thomas Fischer, Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Sonia Piedrafita, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
 
 
  
2 
 
The debates on the European Union’s so-called democratic deficit have gathered momentum since the 
early 1990s and brought the role of national parliaments in EU policymaking into the limelight. Many 
came to describe the deepening and widening of European integration via successive EU treaties as “a 
classic case of a gradual process of de-democratisation”1 because in their view, it has proceeded at the 
expense of parliaments and traditional mechanisms of parliamentary accountability. 
 
According to this “de-parliamentarisation”2 thesis, as a result of the progressive transfer of substantial 
competences from the national to the European level
3
, national legislatures have lost a great deal of 
policy autonomy and control over executive actors
4
 – who dominate EU decision making but often 
lack a corresponding electoral mandate. Given that national parliaments are the main representatives 
of citizens in the Member States, their erosion of power – so the argument goes – has opened up a 
legitimacy gap in EU affairs, which the European Parliament (EP) has not been able to fill. Despite the 
strengthening of the EP in all previous rounds of institutional reform
5
, from the Single European Act 
to the Lisbon Treaty, the rates of participation in European elections, public awareness about the EP’s 
role and general support for the EU have only continued to shrink.
6
 
 
Perceptions of the degree to which national parliaments run the risk of being deprived of influence by 
the on-going process of European integration, as well as opinions on the precise mechanisms and 
channels that can ensure that assemblies preserve control over EU policymaking can vary according to 
specific democratic traditions and parliamentary practices within different Member States. In this 
sense, there is no real ‘one-size-fits-all’-answer to the question of how to shape national parliaments’ 
role across the EU.
7
 
 
Germany provides an illustrative example here, where since the Maastricht Treaty, the rulings of the 
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) have been strongly influenced by the 
conviction that German Basic Law does only allow for the country’s membership in the EU as long as 
it is based on the principle of dual democratic legitimacy – that is, a Union which allows for a 
substantial involvement of national parliaments in European decision making alongside the EP as co-
legislator at the EU level. Although the German Constitutional Court’s reading is highly disputed 
amongst legal scholars
8
 it has contributed considerably to an enhanced role of the German Bundestag 
and Bundesrat in EU policymaking. 
 
  
                                                          
1  Seidelmann, Reimund (1995: 79), “Democracy-building in the European Union: conditions, problems and options” in 
Télo, Mario (ed.), Democratie et Construction Européenne, Brussels: Edition des l’Université de Bruxelles, pp. 73-89. 
2  Schmidt, Vivien A. (1999), “European ‘federalism’ and its encroachments on national institutions”, Publius, Volume 29, 
Number 1, pp. 19-44. See also Wessels, Wolfgang (1989), “The Community at a crossroads”, Bruges: College of Europe; 
Birkinshaw, Patrick and Ashiagbor, Diamond (1996), “National participation in community affairs: democracy, the UK 
Parliament and the EU”, Common Market Law Review, Volume 33, Number 3, pp. 499-529, cited in Auel, Katrin (2012), 
“De-parliamentarisation re-considered – Domestic parliamentary representation in EU affairs”, Paper presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, 20 August-2 September 2012. 
3  Such as with respect to border control, monetary policy or parts of social policy. 
4  Most notably, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission and, especially in the context of the on-going crisis, 
the European Council. 
5  See, for example, Rittberger, Berthold (2005), Building Europe's Parliament. Democratic representation beyond the 
nation state, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Hix, Simon, Noury, Abdul and Roland, Gerard (2007), Democratic 
politics in the European Parliament, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
6  Voter turnout has dropped from 62% in 1979 to a record low 43% in the latest, 2009 EP elections (see: 
www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/000cdcd9d4/Turnout-(1979-2009).html). More than 50% of respondents 
think that the EP does not deal with their concerns and do not feel properly represented by the EP (Special Eurobarometer 
299, “The 2009 European Elections”, September 2008). Trust in the EU has plummeted to 31% in 2013 (Standard 
Eurobarometer 79, “Public Opinion in the European Union”, spring 2013). 
7
 See Hefftler, Claudia, Kreilinger, Valentin, Rozenberg, Olivier, and Wessels, Wolfgang (2013), “National parliaments: 
 their emerging control over European Council”, Policy Brief, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute and TEPSA. 
8
  Callies, Christian and Beichelt, Tim (2013), Auf dem Weg zum Europäisierten Bundestag: Vom Zuschauer zum Akteur? 
 Gütersloh, Bertelsmann Stiftung, pp. 10-11. 
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At the same time, however, there seems to be an increasing realisation that the effects of the ‘euro 
crisis’ have led to a call for new approaches that can foster the principle of dual legitimacy in the EU. 
This sentiment has been fuelled largely by three more recent developments, namely: 
 institutional novelties, in particular the key role assumed by the European Council in the 
response to the crisis, as well as the creation of the Euro Summits; 
 a growing tendency to adopt inter-governmental agreements outside the EU Treaty framework 
and in areas that are not necessarily legislative and, thus, are not covered by national 
parliaments’ control rights in European affairs – such as the Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance (‘Fiscal Compact’), the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism 
or the inter-governmental agreement on a Single Bank Resolution Fund currently under 
negotiation; and 
 the EU’s/Eurozone’s new economic governance architecture that increasingly impinges on the 
‘budgetary sovereignty’ of national parliaments.9 
 
These crisis-driven dynamics have sparked a renewed interest in how national parliaments could “fight 
back”10 against the rise of executive authority and help to ‘cure’ the EU’s legitimacy problem. 
 
1) EU policymaking and the role of national parliaments according to the Treaties… 
 
Efforts to compensate for the Union’s democratic shortfalls by fostering the involvement of national 
parliamentarians in EU policymaking – who, unlike their European counterparts, have closer 
constituency links and are elected in “first-order”11 contests – are not new. Over time, several formal 
opportunities have been taken to provide them with a stronger say, culminating in the Lisbon Treaty, 
which includes national assemblies into the body of EU law and gives them a distinct role beyond that 
of scrutinising their governments.
12
 
 
Building on similar provisions included in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties’ protocols, the 
Lisbon Treaty (Protocol 1) broadens the scope of legislative proposals and other documents
13
 to be 
transferred to Member States’ parliaments from Brussels. Moreover, the current EU Treaty expands to 
eight weeks the timeframe that these assemblies have at their disposal to react to such documents. 
 
Furthermore, the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) specifies that national parliaments can 
contribute to the good functioning of the Union (Article 12 TEU) by participating in certain 
evaluation
14
 and monitoring
15
 procedures, in Conventions dealing with treaty amendments (Article 
48.3 TEU) and in the inter-parliamentary cooperation with the EP. These participatory rights are 
meant to complement the existing political dialogue with the Commission – a 2006 Barroso initiative16 
                                                          
9  Callies and Beichelt (2013), op. cit. and Hefftler et al. (2013), op. cit. 
10  Raunio, Tapio and Hix, Simon (2000), “Backbenchers learn to fight back: European integration and parliamentary 
government”, West European Politics, Volume 23, Number 4, pp. 142-168. 
11  Reif, Karlheinz and Schmitt, Hermann (1980), “Nine second order national elections – A conceptual framework for the 
analysis of European election results”, European Journal of Political Research, Volume 8, Number 1, pp. 3-44. 
12  The Treaty of the European Union (TEU) states that national parliaments ensure compliance of the EU with the principle 
of subsidiarity (Article 5) and hold their governments accountable for their actions in the Council (Article 10). See also, 
Emmanouilidis, Janis A. and Stratulat, Corina (2010), “Implementing Lisbon: narrowing the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’?”, 
EPC Policy Brief, Brussels: European Policy Centre. 
13  Including all draft legislative acts, consultation documents, the annual legislative programme, and any other instrument of 
legislative planning of the Commission, the Council’s agendas and minutes, as well as the Annual Report of the Court of 
Auditors (Articles 5, 6 and 7 TEU). In addition, national parliaments must be notified about new applications for EU 
membership, proposals to amend the Treaty, as well as policies in the area of freedom, security and justice, proceedings 
on Internal Security or Treaty-supplementing measures (Articles 49, 70 and 71 TEU). 
14  Such as of the Union’s policies in the area of freedom, security and justice (Article 70 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU)) and of the activities of the European agency dealing with judicial cooperation – 
EUROJUST (Article 88.5 TFEU). 
15  That is, of the European Police Office – EUROPOL (Article 85.4 TFEU). 
16  Communication from the Commission to the European Council, “A citizens’ agenda. Delivering results for Europe”, 
European Commission, COM (2006) 211 final. 
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– that encourages national parliaments to submit opinions on legislative proposals and consultation 
documents, and binds the Brussels’ executive to answer and take them into account. 
 
In addition, national parliaments have six months to individually veto the use of the passarelle clause 
(Article 48.7 TEU), whereby the Council can decide unanimously to shift from unanimity to majority 
voting in the Council, or to change from a special to the ordinary legislative procedure.
17
 
 
Last but not least, the most avant-garde innovation brought by the Lisbon Treaty is the Early Warning 
Mechanism (EWM), detailed in Protocol 2, which guarantees national parliaments the right to object 
within eight weeks to EU law initiatives that they hold in breach of the subsidiarity principle. Objections 
of non-compliance from at least one-third of all (chambers of) national parliaments require the 
Commission to either review the proposal (the ‘yellow card’) or else to justify why it decides to hold on 
to it. In the latter case, a simple majority of negative opinions can allow the EP or the Council to reject 
the flagged proposal in the first reading of the ordinary legislative procedure (the ‘orange card’). 
 
2) … and in political practice 
 
Thus, the toolbox available to national parliaments to directly engage in EU policy processes is far 
from empty. But are national assemblies exploiting these instruments to their full potential, and are 
these mechanisms fit for purpose? 
 
To date, experience reveals a mixed picture. For instance, while the various inter-parliamentary 
meetings and conferences that regularly bring together parliaments’ speakers18 or members of select 
committees, such as on EU Affairs
19
, can stimulate debates on EU legislation and promote exchanges 
of contacts and best practices, they also tend to disappoint in terms of ambition, impact or incentives 
for attendance.
20
 
 
Similarly, although the number of opinions sent by national parliaments in the framework of the 
political dialogue with the European Commission has generally increased in the past years, 
participation differs across countries
21
, and some chambers complain
22
 that the Commission’s replies 
are too vague or too late to bestow any real meaning to the exercise. 
 
As regards the use of the EWM, the ‘yellow card’ procedure has been hitherto triggered only twice: 
when 12 national parliaments rallied against the proposal for a Council Regulation on the right to take 
collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services (also known as ‘Monti II’), and then again when 11 chambers formed a common front to 
oppose the Commission’s initiative on the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. All other reasoned 
opinions submitted to the Commission (a total of 83 in 2012)
23
 claiming a compromise of the 
subsidiarity principle drew in fewer than 5 national parliaments, and generally underscored the 
assessment that inter alia (i) the 8-week window to object is relatively narrow, (ii) the thresholds are 
rather difficult to reach, (iii) a common interpretation of the subsidiarity concept and a harmonised 
                                                          
17  The same process applies to legislation concerning family law with cross-border implications (Article 81 TFEU).  
18  Each spring, the speakers of the parliaments of the Member States and the President of the EP come together in the 
country that held the presidency during the second semester of the previous year. 
19  Every six months, representatives of the EU Affairs Committees and the EP meet in the Conference of Parliamentary 
Committees for Union Affairs (COSAC) in the country holding the rotating presidency and on the basis of their 
conclusions, they may submit input for the attention of the EU institutions (Article 10 TEU, Protocol 1). 
20  See Piedrafita, Sonia (2013), “EU democratic legitimacy and national parliaments”, CEPS Essay, No. 7/25, pp. 7-8. 
21 Half of the 663 opinions submitted to the Commission in 2012 came from six of the 41 legislative chambers: the 
Portuguese Assembleia, the Italian Senato, the Czech Senate, the German Bundesrat, the Swedish Riksdag and the 
Romanian Camera Deputatilor. Conversely, among the ‘sleepiest’ national parliaments have been the Finnish Eduskunta 
and the Spanish Cortes Generales. See Piedrafita (2013), op. cit., p. 6. 
22 COSAC (2011), Sixteenth Bi-annual Report, “Developments in European Union procedures and practices relevant to 
parliamentary scrutiny”. 
23  With the most active in sending opinions being the Swedish Riksdag (21), French Senate (7), as well as the Dutch Eerste 
Kamer (6) and Tweede Kamer (6). Annual Report 2012 on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, European Commission, 
COM (2013) 566 final, Brussels, 30 July 2013. 
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approach for its application are missing
24
, and (iv) the extent and manner to which the Commission 
considers the views of national assemblies is unclear. 
 
3) National parliaments in the crisis context 
 
But if on the basis of this short account the challenge of effectively implementing existing Treaty 
provisions seems, in itself, complicated to manage, the crisis has added further challenges regarding 
the role of national parliaments as ‘democratic watchdogs’.25 In fact, the global financial and economic 
crunch and, particularly, the ‘euro crisis’ and the responses to it, have worked to bring EU affairs to 
the top of the domestic political agendas and to firmly capture the attention of national parliaments in 
the Member States. 
 
However, when it comes to exerting concrete influence, the crisis-related patterns of EU policymaking 
seem to have strengthened only some national parliaments, most notably the German Bundestag. 
Conversely, the room of manoeuvre of other assemblies, especially in the ‘programme’ countries 
(such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus), appears to have been considerably confined because 
of the strong conditions set by the Troika (including the European Commission, International 
Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank) in return for bailouts. 
 
Moreover, as the European Council (and the Euro Summit) has moved to the frontline of EU 
policymaking by driving key decisions on the crisis recipe, the inadequacy of the structures for 
parliamentary control – either by national assemblies or the EP – in European governance has become 
visible. Member States’ parliaments and the EP were able to exercise formal influence in the ordinary 
legislative procedure and via their national ministers in the Council, but their ability to scrutinise and 
impact the formulation of strategic policy choices made by the Heads of State or Government in the 
European Council has been limited. Equally important, the thickening of the inter-governmental 
channel began to ‘domesticate’ the EU’s democratic deficit by denting the ability of national 
parliaments to keep their own ministers at ‘home’ to account. 
 
Such developments might be specific to the crisis context, and national parliaments may well be in the 
process of adapting to the new circumstances.
26
 Yet the future of parliamentary scrutiny in the course 
of solving the crisis as well as post crisis remains unknown. Just like the ensuing relationship between, 
on the one hand, EU institutions/national governments and, on the other, parliaments, in a potentially 
reinforced Eurozone economic governance system is still to be defined. These uncertainties are often a 
source of anxiety in both stronger and weaker EU countries, inside and outside the euro area. 
 
4) A threefold choice 
 
The road ahead points into three possible directions that are not irreconcilable with each other: refining 
existing instruments, devising additional tools, and revisiting the role of national parliaments at ‘home’. 
 
Upgrade the available gear 
 
The first avenue could see the reinforcement and improvement of mechanisms already in place with 
the aim of beefing up their impact and boosting their credibility in the eyes of national parliaments. In 
the case of the EWM, revisions could include, for example, a more exact definition of the subsidiarity 
                                                          
24  See, for example, the speech of Maroš Šefčovič, European Commissioner for inter-institutional relations and 
administration, in the conference organised by the CEPC, Real Instituto Elcano and Fundación Manuel Giménez Abad, 
Madrid, Spain, 22 October 2010, especially p. 3. 
25  See Emmanouilidis, Janis A. (2012), “Between collateral damage and ‘iron law’”, Greek Review of Political Science, 
Number 36, special issue on the Politics of the Eurozone crisis. 
26  Research shows that national parliaments are devoting increasingly more time and energy to EU issues. Between March 
2011 and March 2012, the 27 lower houses organised some 109 debates as well as 180 meetings in committees. 
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and Ireland have demonstrated more activism than Cyprus, 
Greece, Italy, Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia. See Hefftler et al. (2013), op. cit. 
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principle, longer deadlines and lower thresholds for national parliaments’ reactions to legislative 
proposals by the European Commission, and a better coordination of subsidiarity checks across 
Member States. In addition, the Commission could strengthen its commitment to provide national 
parliaments with a proper and clear follow-up to the opinions submitted by national parliaments. All 
these measures could be taken in the framework of the existing Treaties and without the risk of stalling 
EU decision making. Nevertheless, their efficiency would depend on the readiness and capability of 
national parliaments to use the EWM in a more constructive manner and not merely as a veto 
mechanism. Going one step further, a potential transformation of the ‘yellow’ card into a ‘red’ card, 
giving national parliaments an effective ban and forcing the Commission to withdraw a proposal on 
grounds of subsidiarity infringement, could also be envisioned
27
 but would entail treaty change at a 
time when the appetite for such revisions is at best limited. 
 
Additionally, there is scope to reinforce the political dialogue with the Commission and the inter-
parliamentary cooperation with the European Parliament in order to facilitate the collection of national 
parliamentary positions and to enhance transnational political interaction. Concerning the dialogue with 
the Commission, hearings could, for instance, be held on an institutionalised and regular basis with 
members of the College in national parliaments (on the floor or in the relevant committee) to present and 
debate, for example, the Commission’s work programme or the Country-specific Recommendations 
brought forward in the context of the European Semester. As regards the inter-parliamentary 
collaboration, the Inter-parliamentary Conference on Economic and Financial Governance of the EU 
(convened for the first time on 16-18 October 2013 under the Lithuanian EU Presidency) could become a 
regular platform for networking and exchanges. This Conference could even be turned into a permanent 
forum for national parliaments to develop and express their views on the Annual Growth Strategy (which 
sets out the broad EU economic priorities for the year to come) and on recommendations in the 
framework of the European Semester. 
 
Expand the toolkit 
 
A second possible avenue is the introduction of completely new mechanisms to enhance the influence 
of national parliaments in European affairs and to counter the risk of their growing ‘marginalisation’ 
that may result in the reform process prompted by the on-going crisis. 
 
There is no shortage of proposals down this road. For example, some advocate the enhancement of 
COSAC (Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs) – a ‘super COSAC’ – by 
strengthening its ability to produce more concrete outputs that can directly influence the work of the EU 
institutions. Others call for the establishment of a separate parliamentary chamber bringing together 
members of the EP and national assemblies from the countries of the euro area in order to allow them to 
assume decision-making competences alongside the EU’s main institutional actors. Still others promote 
the idea of setting up a forum for national parliaments in Brussels to monitor those fields of 
EU/Eurozone governance where the EP plays no significant role – especially those areas in which the 
European Council and the Euro Summits have the final say. In addition, there are some who argue that 
the work and recommendations of the Troika, which have an effect not ‘only’ on individual programme 
countries but on the EU as a whole, should be thoroughly scrutinised by the EP in an attempt to 
somehow compensate for the loss of power of national parliaments in the countries concerned. 
 
Finally, the introduction of bilateral “Contractual Arrangements” between individual Member States 
and the Commission (Reform Contracts), which is currently under negotiation, might offer new 
opportunities for national parliaments. If such an arrangement were to be reached with a given country, 
the involvement of its national parliament could go beyond the formal role of ratifying this contract. The 
national parliament in question could actually insist on the right to closely scrutinise the negotiations by 
their government from the very beginning. Such a comprehensive approach might further strengthen the 
                                                          
27  In fact, on 12 January 2014, Conservative members of the UK parliament sent a letter to Prime Minister David Cameron 
publicly suggesting that the House of Commons should have the right to block new EU legislation and repeal existing 
policies that threaten Britain’s ‘national interest’. 
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commitment and public acceptance of the contract negotiated with the European Commission, including 
any potential country-specific reform programmes attached to it. 
 
As good as such ideas might sound in theory, their feasibility and the details of their actual 
implementation have not been spelled out yet. On the one hand, it is rather uncertain whether the 
majority of these proposals would actually have positive consequences given that they might increase 
the number of potential ‘veto’ players in EU policymaking, and thus the risk of multi-institutional 
rivalry and obstructions at the expense of efficient decision making. More actors could also add to the 
complexity of the EU’s institutional setting, making it even harder for citizens to understand how the 
system works or who is accountable for what. On the other hand, the extent to which national 
parliamentarians would make use of such new channels if their outcomes were not binding is highly 
unclear. This is especially pertinent to the suggestion of creating new inter-parliamentary bodies: if the 
decisions taken by these bodies have no real ‘teeth’ in terms of impact, they would struggle to make a 
difference and could not foster public support or democratic legitimacy for the EU. 
 
Think outside the box  
 
The third and final option invites some fresh thinking by arguing that national parliaments should 
mainly focus their energies on the domestic political arena, where they stand to have the highest 
added-value in democratic terms by fulfilling their primary roles: holding governments accountable 
and communicating with electorates. In this line of reasoning, even if national parliaments’ rights to 
access information, participation and objection in EU affairs have the potential to bring ‘Europe’ into 
national debates and closer to citizens, they also ‘distract’ assemblies from their ‘natural’ domestic 
responsibilities. 
 
Considering that the Council is one of the EU´s two legislative bodies, the most straightforward way 
for national parliaments to have a say in European policymaking would actually be to scrutinise and 
shape their governments’ positions before they head off to meetings in Brussels.28 This approach can 
boost democratic legitimacy both at national and EU level, as well as having positive spill-over effects 
on the implementation of EU legislation domestically. At present, the capacity of national parliaments 
across Member States to control and influence their governments’ actions in the EU is far from 
uniform or satisfactory.
29
 The partial exceptions are still Denmark and Finland, where ministers 
negotiating in the Council need the approval of the EU Affairs committee in their countries’ 
parliaments. Other Member States could seek inspiration from these Nordic models in order to further 
improve the robustness of their parliamentary oversight procedures.
30
 Another possible source of 
inspiration could be the German Bundestag, which – alongside the Danish and Finnish assemblies – is 
among the most active and influential national parliaments in the EU. The German example is 
particularly interesting with respect to the administrative reforms it undertook in recent years, which 
provided the Bundestag with the necessary capacities to tackle the huge additional workload that 
resulted from successive legal reinforcements of its role in EU policymaking.
31
 
 
Similarly, national parliaments can best help to raise public awareness and interest in European affairs 
by politicising EU issues at ‘home’. This implies the promotion of political debate, which in turn is a 
defining function of working democracies. By fostering better communication and deliberation about 
European affairs, national parliaments can improve the visibility of the EU’s political dimension on 
the ground, the ability of people to make informed political choices and the capacity of elites to 
                                                          
28  See also, Corbett, Richard (2013), op. cit. 
29  See the ranking of Auel, Rozenberg and Tacea, Angela (2014), “Fighting back? And if yes, how? Measuring 
parliamentary strength and activity in EU affairs” in Hefftler, Claudia, Neuhold, Christine, Rozenberg, Olivier, Smith, 
Julie, Wessels, Wolfgang (eds.), Palgrave handbook on national parliaments and the European Union, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
30  As has been witnessed, for example, in the case of the Irish parliament. See Corbett, Richard (2013), “What role for 
national parliaments in EU law making?”, European Movement blog on BlogActiv.eu.  
31  See Callies and Beichelt (2013), op. cit., pp. 25-26. 
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represent the interests and views of their citizens in Brussels. A more interactive relationship between 
national demoi and their political leaders could then improve democracy both at national and EU level. 
 
5) Three main conclusions 
 
The issue of the role of national parliaments in European affairs set sail in the tenacious quest of the past 
decades for better democratic quality of EU decision making, and has been recently steaming ahead in 
the context of the ‘euro crisis’. By now, it is not only uncontested that assemblies in the Member States 
should be kept in the loop of the Union’s activities but also that national parliaments dispose of a full 
repertoire of different instruments to ensure they can play a direct role in the system. National 
parliaments’ rights  to access information, participation and objection to EU legislation are guaranteed in 
the Treaties, and seek to complement both the traditional functions of these assemblies – that is, to hold 
their governments accountable and communicate with their voters – as well as the work of the European 
Parliament, aiming to safeguard democratic representation and accountability at EU level. 
 
This paper’s brief overview of how national parliaments have performed so far, especially against the 
backdrop of the crisis, in the task of injecting democratic legitimacy into the EU’s political system 
suggests three main conclusions: 
 Existing instruments available to national parliaments – namely, the subsidiarity checks, the 
political dialogue with the Commission and inter-parliamentary cooperation with the EP – can 
and should be further refined to meet their full potential. This can involve some fine-tuning of 
their design for greater efficiency but also a re-calibration of their formal authority to boost their 
policy impact and appeal to parliamentarians. 
However, a state-of-the-art toolkit cannot make a difference unless national parliaments – and 
the concerned EU institutions – make actual use of it, and do so responsibly. In other words, it is 
imperative that national parliaments throughout the EU draw more actively on these 
mechanisms. This might require in some cases an improvement of domestic parliamentary 
capacities and legal frameworks, and that they step up their efforts to cooperate across borders 
for the sake of making a greater impact. At the same time, not to defeat the purpose of these 
tools, the distinction between their use and abuse should be clear. In this sense, for their part, 
national parliaments should not reduce the relationship with the Commission to a mere 
subsidiarity control or an approval exercise. Similarly, the Brussels’ executive should commit to 
more systematic and timely responses to the parliamentary opinions it receives, and tap more 
into the pool of information about different national and public sensitivities provided by 
national parliaments. 
 Any proposals for new instruments are welcome but must be carefully considered on a case-by-
case basis, especially when it comes to new arrangements related to European economic 
governance. Such an assessment needs to reflect not only whether any specific innovation 
involving national parliaments makes sense in practice, from the point of view of implementation, 
but also whether the rationale for establishing yet another channel of influence and control is solid. 
There is a danger that adding to the complexity of the EU system could, at the end of the day, 
damage the efficiency of EU policymaking, which would then harm the public legitimacy and 
accountability of the Union. Moreover, the role of the EP in balancing the contribution of national 
parliaments at EU level should not be overlooked or undermined in the process. Last but not least, 
the temptation to engage in window dressing by setting up weak mechanisms based on half-baked 
ideas should be firmly resisted as it could fuel a feeling of frustration and resentment against 
‘Europe’ amongst citizens. 
 The efforts to strengthen the direct involvement of national parliaments in EU policy 
formulation and adoption by means of better and new instruments should evoke the fact that 
these assemblies still have to fulfil two key domestic responsibilities: to hold their own 
governments, also on EU affairs, accountable, and to maintain the link with voters. These 
functions are the most straightforward and effective ways for national parliaments to influence 
European policies, and to contribute to sound democratic practices at national and European 
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level. Keeping an eye on the EU is important but, as the crisis has amply demonstrated
32
, 
keeping track of what national governments are doing and keeping electorates informed about 
political issues (including EU-related matters) is vital. National parliaments are in the position 
to do precisely that and should therefore mainly preoccupy themselves with building capacity to 
perform these domestic functions in the EU’s multi-level system. 
 
Ultimately, there is no silver bullet on how national parliaments could help the EU overcome its 
democratic challenges. The best shot lies in a combination of approaches and instruments, but also in a 
pragmatic understanding that democratic reality should not be assessed by applying black-and-white 
standards. National parliaments – like all other actors with a stake in fostering democratic principles – 
struggle to cope with their multiple roles at different levels of governance in an increasingly complex 
system of checks and balances. Their primary duty is to identify the most effective channels of influence 
at their disposal, and to use them responsibly without undermining the functioning of the system at either 
the national or the European level. EU institutions and governments should focus on providing suitable 
legal structures, not fig leaves, for a comprehensive involvement of national parliaments and the EP, and 
should commit to implementing them in practice. The way ahead is likely to be a steep learning curve, 
but the final destination – a better democratic system for the EU – will make the journey all worth it. 
                                                          
32  See, for example, “Former ECB chief blames governments for euro-crisis”, EUobserver, 14 January 2014. 
